MOGADISHU (Somaliguardian) – The United States has given the UN more time to wind down its Somalia support, but not a permanent reprieve. International Crisis Group warns that the security architecture protecting Somalia for nearly two decades is approaching its end. The decisive question is whether Somali forces can assume responsibility before the system beneath them disappears.

Somalia has been given more time.

It has not been given more certainty.

On 18 September 2026, the United States agreed to give the United Nations another year to phase out its support for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, or AUSSOM. The drawdown is now expected to begin in January 2027 rather than amounting to an abrupt end to UN support at the start of next year. But Washington is still moving away from funding and supporting the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, known as UNSOS, which provides the logistical machinery on which AUSSOM heavily depends.

That distinction is at the heart of Somalia’s next security crisis.

The International Crisis Group’s latest report, “Somalia Awaits a New Security Order as Mission Drawdown Looms,” argues that the multilateral security system that has helped the Somali government confront Al-Shabaab since 2007 is approaching its final phase. Crisis Group says the new U.S. position buys time for a more orderly transition — but does not solve the fundamental problem of what replaces UNSOS, and potentially AUSSOM, once the drawdown gathers pace.

For Somalia, this is not simply a story about foreign troops leaving.

It is a test of whether the country can finally carry the weight of its own security.

And the answer is complicated.

Somali forces are stronger than they were a decade ago. They have recruited and trained thousands of new personnel and increasingly lead operations against Al-Shabaab.

But they still rely on foreign intelligence, air support, training, financing and — critically — logistics.

That creates the central paradox of Somalia’s transition:

The country is being asked to take over the security system at the same time that the international system supporting its forces is being dismantled.

The next year could therefore determine whether Somalia moves toward genuine security sovereignty – or enters a more fragmented era in which Somali forces, AUSSOM contingents and bilateral foreign militaries operate alongside one another with uneven resources and competing priorities.

What is UNSOS – and why does its withdrawal matter so much?

For readers asking “What is UNSOS?”, the answer is crucial to understanding the entire crisis.

UNSOS is not simply another foreign military force in Somalia.

It is the logistical backbone supporting AUSSOM.

The UN office provides food, water, fuel, transport, engineering, communications, equipment maintenance, aviation services, medical support and casualty evacuation. It supports AUSSOM personnel deployed across five sectors and 49 locations covering roughly 400,000 square kilometres in south-central Somalia.

UNSOS also provides non-lethal logistical support to Somali security forces operating jointly or in coordination with AUSSOM.

Under the current UN mandate, that support can cover up to 20,900 Somali National Army and Somali National Police personnel, including food, water, fuel, transport, communications, medical evacuation, defensive supplies and training.

That makes UNSOS much more important than its relatively obscure name suggests.

AUSSOM can deploy soldiers.

UNSOS helps keep those soldiers supplied.

Without that supply chain, a force may still possess weapons and personnel but struggle to remain operational across a large, hostile theatre.

This is why the future of AUSSOM cannot be separated from the future of UNSOS.

The two missions are formally distinct.

Operationally, they have become deeply intertwined.

What is AUSSOM?

AUSSOM is the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, the successor to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, or ATMIS.

The mission emerged at the end of 2024 as part of the international effort to gradually transfer security responsibility to Somali forces.

The UN Security Council extended AUSSOM’s current mandate through 31 December 2026 and authorised up to 11,826 uniformed personnel, including 680 police officers.

AUSSOM’s history matters.

The African Union mission has been part of Somalia’s security architecture since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007. African troops helped push Al-Shabaab out of many major urban centres, including Mogadishu in 2011.

But the mission has changed.

Its troop strength has fallen from roughly 22,000 at its mid-2010s peak to around 12,000 today, according to Crisis Group. Rather than conducting large-scale offensive operations deep inside Al-Shabaab-held territory, AUSSOM has increasingly concentrated on protecting areas it already holds and supporting Somali-led operations.

That is important because the international transition is occurring while the AU mission itself has less manpower and increasingly severe financial constraints.

The UN security umbrella is not disappearing overnight

The latest U.S. decision changes the immediate timetable.

In July, Washington informed the AU that it would not support extending UNSOS beyond its existing mandate. The U.S. position subsequently softened, and American diplomats indicated in September that Washington would accept a 12-month extension to allow a drawdown rather than an abrupt termination.

That gives Somalia and its partners additional time.

But it does not restore the old system.

The central direction remains the same: UNSOS is moving toward closure or a substantially reduced role.

And that means the coming year should not be treated as another opportunity to postpone the problem.

It should be treated as a deadline for designing what comes next.

Crisis Group’s warning is especially important here.

The organisation rejects the simplistic idea that the end of international support automatically means that the Somali government will collapse or that Al-Shabaab will sweep across the country.

Al-Shabaab remains a serious threat and controls significant rural areas, but it does not control most of Somalia’s urban centres, while Mogadishu’s security situation has improved significantly in recent years.

The real danger is a badly managed transition.

That distinction matters.

The question everyone is asking: Can Somali forces take over?

Not completely – at least not yet.

But that does not mean Somali forces are incapable of assuming substantially greater responsibility.

In fact, that transition has already begun.

The Somali National Army has expanded significantly, and Crisis Group reports that foreign-supported training programmes involving partners such as Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Eritrea have generated more than 10,000 new troops.

Somali forces have also increasingly led operations against Al-Shabaab.

The country is therefore not starting from zero.

But replacing an international military mission is not simply a matter of replacing one soldier with another.

It requires an entire security ecosystem.

Can Somali forces:

• deploy rapidly across the country?
• supply troops without UN logistics?
• transport fuel and ammunition to remote positions?
• evacuate wounded soldiers?
• maintain vehicles and communications equipment?
• provide intelligence and surveillance?
• call in effective air support?
• reinforce an isolated base quickly?
• hold territory after an offensive?
• provide policing and administration after military forces arrive?
• operate under one coherent national command?
• maintain forces when foreign funding declines?

Those are much harder questions.

And this is where the Crisis Group assessment becomes particularly significant.

It says the Somali National Army is still ill-prepared to rapidly and fully replace AUSSOM.

Some areas handed over to Somali forces in recent years have subsequently fallen back into Al-Shabaab’s hands. Even when Somali forces have led operations, including campaigns in Lower Shabelle, they have remained dependent on external support.

So the answer is not that Somalia has no capable forces.

The answer is that Somalia has growing military capacity without yet possessing a fully self-sustaining national security system.

That is a very different problem.

Capturing territory is not the same as holding it

This may be the single most important military lesson from Somalia’s transition.

A military can capture a town.

A state must hold it.

The difference is enormous.

Holding territory requires soldiers to remain supplied. It requires roads to remain open. It requires intelligence. It requires police. It requires functioning local administration. It requires courts, services and political legitimacy.

If those systems do not follow the soldiers, an offensive can create only temporary control.

Al-Shabaab has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to exploit such gaps.

The group remains capable of asymmetric attacks, ambushes, improvised explosive-device attacks and economic coercion.

That means the real measure of Somali military readiness should not be simply the number of troops on paper.

It should be whether those troops can deploy, sustain, reinforce and hold territory independently.

Why UNSOS is difficult to replace

This is where Somalia’s transition becomes brutally practical.

Suppose the UN leaves.

Who supplies AUSSOM troops with fuel?

Who transports supplies?

Who maintains vehicles?

Who handles medical evacuation?

Who provides aviation?

Who repairs infrastructure?

Who supplies remote bases?

Those are not theoretical questions.

They are the daily mechanics of military power.

Crisis Group says there is currently no obvious replacement for UNSOS capable of immediately providing the same level of logistical support to a multinational force.

One possibility is for the African Union to create its own logistical operation.

But the AU does not currently possess an equivalent system with UNSOS’s experience and scale.

Another possibility is outsourcing logistics to private contractors.

But Crisis Group notes that building a system with comparable capabilities could take up to two years – while the AU itself is struggling to finance the mission.

The third possibility is simply shrinking AUSSOM.

That would save money.

It could also mean fewer bases, fewer troops and less ability to operate outside major population centres.

In other words:

Every replacement option involves a trade-off.

Could AUSSOM survive without UNSOS?

In its current form, the answer is highly uncertain.

UNSOS currently supports AUSSOM across 49 locations, providing food, water, fuel, transportation, engineering, aviation, communications, maintenance and medical services.

Crisis Group says AU officials privately regard the mission as unable to continue in anything resembling its current form without UN support.

That leaves several possible futures.

AUSSOM option one: Build an AU logistics system

The AU could attempt to replace UNSOS.

The problem is time, expertise and money.

AUSSOM option two: Shrink the mission

A smaller AUSSOM could concentrate on Mogadishu and other strategic locations.

But fewer troops would mean less territorial coverage.

AUSSOM option three: Create a regional force

African troop contributors could retain forces under a new regional arrangement.

But this would still leave questions over logistics, funding and command.

AUSSOM option four: Shift toward bilateral security partnerships

Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and other partners could maintain forces through bilateral agreements with Somalia.

Türkiye could continue training and supporting Somali forces.

The United States could continue counter-terrorism operations and air support.

This may be the most realistic bridge.

But it also creates a new problem.

Somalia could trade one security system for a patchwork

For almost two decades, the international security architecture in Somalia has had a common framework.

A bilateral future would be different.

Kenya and Ethiopia have powerful interests in border security.

Uganda has maintained a long-running military presence in Somalia.

Türkiye has developed an exceptionally close security partnership with Mogadishu.

The United States is focused heavily on counter-terrorism.

These interests overlap.

They are not identical.

Crisis Group therefore warns that a poorly coordinated bilateral system could produce zones of influence that reinforce Somalia’s existing political divisions.

That could create a strange new map of Somalia:

one partner focused on Mogadishu;

another near the Kenyan border;

another around Ethiopia’s frontier;

Somali forces operating between them;

and Al-Shabaab exploiting whatever spaces remain weakly protected.

The challenge for Mogadishu will be to turn these separate relationships into a coherent national security strategy.

The political problem may be more dangerous than the military problem

Somalia’s security transition is often described as a question of troops.

It is also a question of politics.

Crisis Group identifies political divisions between the federal government and powerful federal member states, including Puntland and Jubaland, as a major obstacle to building a unified national security system.

That matters enormously.

A national army cannot function effectively if the country’s political leadership remains divided over:

• who commands security forces;
• where troops should be deployed;
• how resources are distributed;
• how federal and state authorities share power;
• how elections are organised;
• and which institutions ultimately control national security.

Crisis Group notes that during political crises, federal and state forces have sometimes faced one another.

That is the nightmare scenario for a country attempting to consolidate its security architecture.

Every soldier deployed against another Somali security force is a soldier unavailable for the fight against Al-Shabaab.

Every political dispute that paralyses security coordination gives an armed insurgency another opening.

What could Al-Shabaab gain from a badly managed transition?

This question requires precision.

The Crisis Group report does not say that Al-Shabaab will automatically defeat the Somali government after UNSOS withdraws.

That would be an unjustified conclusion.

But it does identify several vulnerabilities that could become more serious.

1. Abandoned or weakened bases

If foreign troops withdraw from positions without a Somali replacement capable of holding them, Al-Shabaab could move into the resulting vacuum.

2. Vulnerable roads

Control of roads and economic corridors matters both militarily and financially.

3. Isolated towns

Smaller towns surrounded by areas of Al-Shabaab influence could become particularly exposed.

4. Reduced logistical reach

Without UN support, foreign troops may have to consolidate closer to major cities or their own national borders.

5. Reduced operational tempo

A shortage of fuel, transport, aviation or medical evacuation can restrict military operations even when troops remain available.

6. Political fragmentation

If federal and state authorities continue to disagree over security, Al-Shabaab can benefit from the resulting gaps.

The Crisis Group report specifically highlights vulnerabilities around parts of Lower Shabelle and Hirshabelle, including towns and roads that could become more exposed if foreign forces withdraw.

The danger, therefore, is not necessarily an overnight collapse.

It is incremental erosion.

A base here.

A road there.

A rural district elsewhere.

A government presence that becomes thinner.

An insurgent network that becomes bolder.

Security transitions rarely fail with one dramatic event.

They can fail one gap at a time.

The money problem behind Somalia’s security problem

There is another reality that cannot be ignored:

security costs money.

Troops require salaries.

Vehicles require fuel.

Aircraft require maintenance.

Bases require electricity, water and repairs.

Wounded soldiers require evacuation and medical treatment.

Communications systems require equipment and maintenance.

And none of these requirements disappear because international troops leave.

UNSOS’s current system is therefore not merely a military arrangement.

It is an enormous financial mechanism.

Reuters reports that UNSOS operates with an annual budget of roughly $500 million, underscoring the scale of the infrastructure that Somalia and its partners are being asked to replace.

Meanwhile, AUSSOM itself has struggled with funding.

Crisis Group describes the AU mission as having run a substantial deficit for years, while traditional donors have reduced their contributions.

The financial problem therefore has two layers:

Who pays for the international mission?

And increasingly:

Who pays for Somalia’s own security forces?

Somalia has improved its domestic revenue collection and has financed some military operations itself, according to Crisis Group. But the country’s fiscal capacity remains limited relative to the scale of its security requirements.

That makes donor coordination essential.

Somalia’s foreign partners could become the bridge

The end of UNSOS does not necessarily mean the end of international military assistance.

Far from it.

Crisis Group identifies an increasingly important network of bilateral relationships.

Türkiye

Türkiye has become one of Somalia’s most important security partners, training thousands of Somali troops and providing military capabilities including drones and F-16 aircraft. Ankara also has extensive strategic and economic interests in Somalia.

United States

Washington says it intends to continue bilateral counter-terrorism operations, including air capabilities, even as it moves away from supporting UNSOS.

Uganda

Ugandan forces have maintained a major presence around Mogadishu and have been central to the African Union mission since its beginning.

Kenya

Kenyan forces remain particularly important in areas near Somalia’s southern border.

Ethiopia

Ethiopian forces maintain a significant security role along their border and within Somalia.

These relationships could provide the security bridge Somalia needs.

But there is a condition.

They have to be coordinated.

Somalia needs a security coalition, not competing security arrangements

This may be the most important recommendation emerging from the Crisis Group report.

Mogadishu should establish a regular forum bringing together:

• the Federal Government;
• federal member states;
• AUSSOM troop contributors;
• bilateral military partners;
• the African Union;
• the United Nations;
• major donors.

The purpose would be simple:

Who is responsible for what after UNSOS?

Which force protects which city?

Who supports which road?

Who provides aviation?

Who pays?

Who supplies Somali units?

Where will foreign forces remain?

Which positions will Somali forces inherit?

What happens if Al-Shabaab attacks?

And how does Somalia ensure that foreign security partnerships strengthen rather than fragment the national security system?

Crisis Group argues that such coordination is essential to prevent bilateral security relationships from turning into competing zones of influence.

This is not diplomatic housekeeping.

It is national security planning.

The 14,000-soldier question

Mogadishu said in early August that it had approximately 14,000 troops available for military operations who could potentially be used as holding forces in areas vacated by departing AU troops, according to Crisis Group.

That figure sounds substantial.

But numbers alone can be deceptive.

A force of 14,000 soldiers cannot automatically substitute for an international mission simply because the headcount appears comparable in some locations.

The real comparison is capability.

AUSSOM brings foreign contingents with established command structures, external financing, military logistics and access to the UNSOS support network.

Somali units may have fewer resources and remain dependent on external support.

A one-for-one substitution could therefore be dangerous.

The question should not be:

How many Somali soldiers can replace departing AU soldiers?

It should be:

How many Somali soldiers can sustainably hold each strategically important area with the logistics, intelligence, mobility and political support required to prevent its loss?

That is a much harder calculation.

What happens to Mogadishu?

Mogadishu is likely to remain the centre of gravity of the new security order.

The city has benefited from improved security in recent years, and the Somali government retains control of the capital. Crisis Group argues that Al-Shabaab remains largely concentrated in rural areas even though it continues to threaten the government and conduct attacks.

That means a future security architecture is likely to prioritise:

• Mogadishu;
• major regional capitals;
• airports;
• ports;
• major roads;
• economic corridors;
• strategically important towns.

But concentrating resources in urban centres carries a risk.

If rural areas are abandoned too quickly, Al-Shabaab can consolidate its influence outside the cities.

That can eventually translate into economic pressure, taxation, recruitment and attacks against government-controlled areas.

Urban security and rural security are therefore not separate problems.

They are connected.

What happens to rural Somalia?

This could be the hardest part of the transition.

Al-Shabaab has historically demonstrated that it does not need to control every major city to remain a powerful insurgent organisation.

Its rural presence allows it to:

• move fighters;
• collect taxes;
• establish checkpoints;
• gather intelligence;
• launch attacks;
• threaten supply routes;
• and impose its authority in areas where government institutions are weak.

A smaller international footprint could therefore produce a geographic imbalance:

government control in cities, insurgent influence in the countryside.

That may be sustainable for a period.

But it does not amount to a decisive resolution of Somalia’s security problem.

What Somali forces need before the final handover

If Somalia is to assume the security burden successfully, troop recruitment cannot be the only priority.

The country needs to build the supporting architecture around its soldiers.

1. Logistics

Somali forces must increasingly be able to supply themselves with food, fuel, transport and equipment.

2. Medical evacuation

A force operating without dependable casualty evacuation becomes vulnerable quickly.

/UNSOS currently provides medical infrastructure and MEDEVAC/CASEVAC support.

3. Mobility

Somali forces must be able to move rapidly between threatened areas.

4. Intelligence

Operations against an adaptive insurgency depend on reliable intelligence.

5. Air support

Foreign air capabilities have become an important component of operations against Al-Shabaab.

6. Command and control

Federal and state forces need a clearer national security framework.

7. Financing

A sustainable national army requires predictable domestic and international financing.

8. Territorial governance

Military operations need to be followed by functioning civilian administration.

9. Political agreement

Federal and member-state authorities need to agree on who is responsible for what.

10. Accountability

A national security force needs public legitimacy as well as battlefield capability.

That is what makes the transition so difficult.

Somalia is not merely building an army.

It is trying to build a state capable of sustaining an army.

The danger of replacing one dependency with another

There is an uncomfortable possibility hidden inside the transition.

Somalia could successfully reduce its dependence on a UN-AU security structure only to become more dependent on several bilateral partners.

That would be a change in architecture, but not necessarily a complete transition to self-reliance.

Crisis Group sees bilateral relationships as the most pragmatic short-term way of preventing a major security deterioration. But it also makes clear that this should be viewed as a temporary bridge while Somali forces develop the capacity to assume greater responsibility.

The distinction is crucial.

Bilateral assistance can buy time.

It cannot permanently substitute for a functioning Somali security state.

The 2027 question

The most important date may no longer be simply 31 December 2026.

The real question is what Somalia looks like during and after the expected 2027 drawdown.

The additional year gives Mogadishu and its partners an opportunity to plan.

But the year could also disappear quickly.

By the time the logistical drawdown is fully under way, Somalia cannot still be debating basic questions about who will provide fuel, transport and medical evacuation.

Those decisions need to be made before the infrastructure disappears.

Crisis Group therefore argues that Somalia and its partners should use the temporary reprieve to construct a new security system capable of operating from the second half of 2027.

That makes 2026–27 less a period of waiting than a period of preparation.

Is Somalia ready?

The evidence points to a nuanced answer.

Somalia is more capable than it was.

Its security forces have expanded.

Thousands of troops have received foreign training.

Somali forces increasingly lead operations.

The government has developed greater domestic revenue capacity.

International partners remain willing to provide forms of bilateral support.

But Somalia is not yet fully self-sufficient.

Its forces remain dependent on external logistical and operational assistance.

Some areas transferred to Somali forces have subsequently been lost.

Political disputes continue to weaken national security coordination.

Federal and state security structures remain fragmented.

AUSSOM itself still provides an important security buffer.

And the logistical infrastructure behind that mission is now approaching its own transition.

That is why the most accurate answer is neither “Somalia is ready” nor “Somalia is incapable.”

The evidence suggests that Somalia can assume more responsibility, but a rapid one-for-one replacement of AUSSOM by Somali forces would carry significant risks.

What Somalia should do now

The Crisis Group report points toward a practical roadmap.

First: Build the replacement system before dismantling the old one

The transition should not be based on hope that another arrangement will emerge later.

Second: Keep bilateral partners coordinated

Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Türkiye, the United States and other partners should operate within a coherent Somali-led security framework.

Third: Prioritise strategic territory

Somali forces should be ready to move into areas where foreign troops withdraw, particularly around major towns, roads and infrastructure.

Fourth: Avoid overextending the army

Crisis Group argues that Somalia should be cautious about launching major new offensives while the security architecture itself is being transformed.

Fifth: Resolve political disputes

A fragmented political system cannot easily produce a unified national security force.

Sixth: Create predictable financing

Somalia and its partners need a realistic multi-year funding model for both international support and the Somali security forces.

Seventh: Give federal member states a place in the security transition

A national security plan that excludes powerful regional actors risks reproducing the very divisions that have weakened the security sector.

The biggest mistake would be to confuse withdrawal with transition

There is a temptation to see the end of UNSOS as simply the end of international involvement.

That would be wrong.

The real story is about what comes after the international system.

If the withdrawal is coordinated, Somalia could emerge with a more genuinely Somali-led security architecture, supported by carefully structured bilateral partnerships.

If the withdrawal is chaotic, Somalia could face shrinking security coverage, increased pressure on vulnerable towns and roads, financial crises inside security institutions and greater opportunities for Al-Shabaab.

The outcome is therefore not predetermined.

It depends on what happens during the transition.

Somalia’s security order is being rewritten

For nearly twenty years, the international community has helped Somalia keep the lights on in its security sector.

Now the scaffolding is coming down.

The United States has granted another year for the UN to wind down its support, giving Somalia and its partners additional time. But the direction of travel remains unmistakable. UNSOS is approaching the end of its current role, while AUSSOM faces the difficult task of determining whether and how it can survive without the logistical system that sustains it.

Somali forces have made real progress.

But progress is not the same as readiness for complete independence.

The decisive test will be whether Somalia can convert an expanding army into a sustainable national security institution — one capable not merely of fighting, but of supplying itself, holding territory, protecting roads, working with regional authorities and maintaining security after foreign partners reduce their presence.

Al-Shabaab will be watching that transition.

So will Somalia’s neighbours.

So will Türkiye, the United States, the African Union, the European Union and the Gulf states.

And perhaps most importantly, so will ordinary Somalis living in the towns and villages where the difference between a functioning security system and a security vacuum is measured in whether a road remains open, a market remains accessible, a school remains protected and a family can travel without fear.

The coming transition is therefore larger than the fate of one UN office.

It is a test of the Somali state itself.

Can Somalia take responsibility for its own security?

The evidence suggests that it is moving toward that goal.

But the evidence also suggests that it is not yet ready to do so without substantial external support.

That is precisely why the next year matters.

The clock has not stopped.

It has merely been reset.

And when UNSOS finally begins to disappear, Somalia will discover whether the security architecture built in its place is strong enough to stand on its own.

Contact us: info@somaliguardian.com