The Greatest Weakness Of The Amendment Bill Is Not What It Changes

By Alpha Amadu Jalloh

Having examined the principal amendments proposed throughout the Bill, a broader constitutional picture begins to emerge. Constitutional amendments should always be assessed collectively because the Constitution is an integrated legal framework rather than a collection of isolated provisions. Every amendment affects the relationship between institutions, and every institutional change ultimately affects the relationship between the State and its citizens.

One of the most noticeable weaknesses of the Amendment Bill is its emphasis on restructuring institutions without giving equal attention to strengthening constitutional accountability. Institutional reform is important, but institutional reform without stronger safeguards may simply reorganise authority rather than improve governance.

The Bill also places considerable emphasis on appointments, qualifications and administrative arrangements while giving comparatively little constitutional attention to transparency. In modern constitutional democracies, transparency is no longer regarded as an administrative preference. It is a constitutional principle. Citizens have a right to understand how constitutional office holders are selected, how independent commissions make decisions and how electoral processes are administered. The Constitution should expressly promote openness rather than assuming that transparency will emerge through ordinary legislation.

Another concern is the continued constitutional concentration of appointment authority. Although the proposed Search and Nomination mechanisms represent an improvement in certain respects, they do not entirely remove executive influence from appointments to key constitutional institutions. Democratic constitutions function most effectively when those responsible for supervising government are not perceived to owe their positions primarily to the government they may later be required to scrutinise.

This concern becomes particularly significant because Sierra Leone’s constitutional history demonstrates that institutional confidence is often more important than institutional design. A technically well drafted institution will struggle to command public trust if citizens perceive that its independence is compromised. Constitutions must therefore protect both actual independence and the appearance of independence.

The Bill also misses an opportunity to constitutionalise public participation. Modern constitutions increasingly recognise that constitutional governance belongs to the people rather than to political elites. Constitutional amendments affecting electoral institutions, constitutional commissions and democratic processes should ideally require meaningful consultation before significant changes are introduced. Public participation strengthens constitutional legitimacy because citizens become partners in constitutional development rather than passive observers.

Another weakness is the limited constitutional recognition of technological change. Elections, governance and public administration have evolved significantly since the adoption of the 1991 Constitution. Constitutional reform could have established broader principles governing technological integrity, protection of electoral data, cybersecurity and digital transparency while leaving operational details to legislation. Instead, the Bill remains largely focused on institutional restructuring.

The constitutional protection of integrity could also have been strengthened. While qualifications and appointment procedures receive attention, comparatively little emphasis is placed upon ethical standards, conflicts of interest, financial disclosure and continuing accountability for constitutional office holders. Public confidence depends not merely upon competence but equally upon integrity.

The relationship between constitutional commissions also deserves clearer constitutional definition. Independent institutions should cooperate where necessary while remaining free from inappropriate interference by one another. Clear constitutional boundaries reduce institutional conflict and improve administrative effectiveness.

One of the most significant omissions concerns civic education. A Constitution cannot succeed if citizens do not understand it. Constitutional reform should have been accompanied by stronger constitutional recognition of civic education as a continuing national responsibility. Democracy flourishes where citizens understand not only their rights but also the constitutional responsibilities of public institutions.

Looking back across Sierra Leone’s constitutional evolution, one finds remarkable consistency in one important aspiration. From the gradual constitutional reforms during the colonial period, through Independence in 1961, the Republican transition in 1971 and the restoration of multiparty democracy under the 1991 Constitution, each generation sought in its own way to improve constitutional governance. Some reforms succeeded. Others produced unintended consequences. That historical experience should encourage humility whenever constitutional amendments are proposed.

No constitution is ever perfect. The 1991 Constitution itself has shortcomings that deserve careful reform. However, constitutional amendments should always move the nation closer to broader participation, stronger accountability, greater institutional independence and deeper respect for the rule of law. Every amendment should strengthen the Republic more than it strengthens the government of the day.

My final recommendations are therefore clear.

Appointments to independent constitutional institutions should involve genuinely independent nomination processes.

Public interviews for senior constitutional offices should become the constitutional norm.

Institutional independence should receive stronger constitutional guarantees.

Parliamentary oversight should be expanded rather than limited.

Transparency should become an express constitutional obligation.

Citizens should enjoy greater participation in future constitutional reform processes.

Electoral institutions should remain demonstrably impartial in both law and practice.

Constitutional transitions should be governed by precise implementation provisions that minimise uncertainty.

The Constitution should continue evolving in favour of democratic accountability rather than administrative convenience.

Ultimately, every constitution asks a simple question of each generation. Will those entrusted with constitutional reform leave the Republic stronger than they found it? That is the question confronting Sierra Leone today.

History will not judge the Amendment Bill according to how efficiently it reorganised constitutional institutions. It will judge whether it expanded democratic freedom, strengthened public confidence, protected institutional independence and preserved the sovereignty of the people.

That has been the constitutional aspiration of Sierra Leone from the earliest constitutional arrangements of the nineteenth century, through the Independence Constitution of 1961, the Republican Constitution of 1971, the difficult experience of the 1978 one party Constitution and the democratic renewal embodied in the 1991 Constitution.

The Constitution does not belong to Parliament. It does not belong to the President. It does not belong to political parties. It belongs to the people of Sierra Leone. Every amendment should therefore be measured against one enduring constitutional principle. Will this change better protect the liberty, dignity and democratic rights of every Sierra Leonean citizen, not only today but for generations yet unborn?

Only amendments that satisfy that test deserve a permanent place in the supreme law of the Republic.